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The future of raising finance - A new opportunity to commit fraud: 
A review of Initial Coin Offering (ICO) scams 
Abstract 
Over one billion US dollars were invested in blockchain in 2016. The potential application of 
blockchain extends far beyond cryptocurrencies. One use of blockchain is an Initial Coin 
Offering (ICO), a digital method of raising finance involving issuance of tokens in exchange 
for cryptocurrencies or fiat money. It is a cheaper, easier and quicker way to raise funds 
compared with traditional public offerings. However, it has raised a new opportunity for fraud. 
An estimated ten percent of ICO funds have been lost to fraud. Using case-study analysis, this 
study determines characteristics of such fraud schemes and the regulatory changes made in 
response to them. The study reveals key lessons for investors in terms of proactive steps that 
can be taken to protect themselves from being victims, for issuers to ensure awareness and take 
steps to secure investors’ trust, and for regulators to promote a safe environment. To the best 
of our knowledge, this study is the first to document the effect of ICO fraud schemes on the 
regulatory environment, which is going through a series of amendments to provide protection 
against such fraudulent schemes. Additionally, it provides direction for future research to 
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1. Introduction 
More than one billion US dollars have been invested in blockchain technology in 2016 because 
of potential benefits that the technology may provide (Kennedy 2016). The potential 
application of blockchain extends far beyond cryptocurrencies. The innovation and prominent 
use of blockchain technology has given birth to a new way of raising finance known as the 
Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs” or “ICO”). This new method is a cheaper, easier and quicker 
way to raise funds compared with traditional public offerings. In an ICO, the issuer issues 
tokens to investors in exchange for other cryptocurrencies or fiat money during a specified time 
frame, sometimes to raise funds for development activities pursued by the issuer. The issued 
tokens will facilitate owner-access to services provided by the issuer, or may be used as an 
independent virtual currency. The investment in an ICO does not grant ownership in the 
company, as is the case in an initial public offer (IPO), but is considered an investment in a 
virtual product which is likely to appreciate in the future. The appreciation is based upon 
investment in the technology provided, growth of business and increased demand for the virtual 
product being offered.  
An ICO should not be confused with crowdfunding. Crowdfunding facilitates solicitation of 
investments or donations by providing a platform to leverage the geographical and social reach 
of the internet to connect fundraisers to a vast number of potential supporters (Fleming and 
Sorenson 2016). The two methods of funding may appear similar, but they have important 
differences. In terms of accessibility, crowdfunding is generally limited to a certain country or 
to regions, whereas ICOs are accessible to a wider range of investors. In terms of product, ICOs 
generally fund technology-related products while crowdfunding may span various categories 
such as hardware, software, technology and food. However, in recent times, ICOs have 
expanded beyond technology offerings. Differences also exist in relation to crowdfunding and 
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ICOs related to their regulations; the regulations related to ICOs and their evolvement will be 
briefly discussed in this paper. 
The excitement around other cryptocurrencies and the urge to be part of something innovative 
has led to a surge in raising funds through an ICO, particularly by tech start-up firms. In 2017, 
an amount close to four billion US dollars was raised through ICOs (Ernst & Young 2017). 
This method of raising funds did not require compliance with securities regulations and hence 
provided a way to avoid compliance costs. This made it easier to pursue business development 
activities, especially for start-ups. There is no doubt this new way of raising finance is creating 
new opportunities, but at the same time it has provided an opportunity to commit fraud. The 
frenzy around ICOs and lack of due diligence before investing in them provides an opportunity 
for fraudsters to easily carry out their operations as is evident from the fact that more than ten 
percent of funds raised through ICOs have been lost to fraud (Ernst & Young 2017). 
Consequently, it is essential to examine the modus operandi of these large-scale fraudulent 
schemes to protect investors from falling prey to such schemes in the future and losing their 
hard-earned money. Additionally, it is necessary to be able to distinguish between potential 
fraudsters and genuine firms seeking to raise funds so as not to stifle the growth opportunities 
presented by this new fund-raising method. These modi operandi will remain a source of 
reference for regulators to enhance the regulations surrounding such means of raising funds. 
Research makes it clear that the risk posed by terrorism used to be underestimated as was the 
scale and extent to which it could affect people (Kotabe 2005). A proactive approach towards 
ICO frauds might help prevent repeating the mistake committed in the case of terrorism. 
Consequently, the primary objective of the paper is to analyze the instances of ICO frauds to 
determine the characteristics of such schemes. An analysis was conducted on cases available 
in the public domain. There are plenty of smaller, alleged ICO scams, but there is often little 
information about these and the reliability of the information that is available is questionable. 
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This problem doesn’t exist with cases that government authorities are involved with and so 
they are the focus in this paper. 
It is essential to understand the regulatory environment and the historical changes that have 
taken place, as different countries have different regulations and what may be considered 
illegal in one country may be acceptable in others (Kshetri 2005). These differences provide 
opportunities to perpetuate fraud. Hence, the second objective of this paper is to cast light on 
the regulatory steps taken in different jurisdictions about ICOs and what is the current 
regulatory stance concerning ICOs. The jurisdictions covered in this paper represent those in 
which either a clear regulatory position has been taken or in which meaningful ICO activity, 
in terms of the amount of funds raised, has taken place. The information provided can inform 
both issuers and investors of the country-specific regulatory developments in which an ICO is 
being offered and the extent to which the offering is compliant with existing or possible 
future regulations. The motivation is to aid genuine issuers in avoiding the cost of non-
compliance and for investors to check the degree of compliance of an ICO being offered, and 
to some extent determine its legitimacy and security of the funds being invested. The 
provided discussion can also inform future policy discussions relating to this emerging field.  
The blockchain technology, because of its essential feature of virtual immutability, is being 
brought to use in a wide range of fields such as supply-chain and logistics, financial data 
verification and real-time updates of financial information, among others. It has also provided 
a unique opportunity for firms to raise funds via ICOs to finance their operations. As 
mentioned above, ICOs differ from other methods of raising funds in terms of accessibility, 
cost, time efficiency, projects funded and regulations involved. However, the benefits of 
ICOs come at the cost of creating a new opportunity for perpetuating fraudulent activities. To 
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to document the effect of ICO fraud schemes 
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on the regulatory environment, which is going through a series of amendments to provide 
protection against such fraudulent schemes.  
The paper also contributes to the literature by providing key insights for the concerned 
stakeholders (issuers, investors and regulators) to help them be proactive in countering ICO 
fraud. Proactive methods are outlined for investors to protect themselves. Information is 
provided for issuers to ensure awareness and to help them take steps to secure the trust of 
investors. Finally, insights are provided for regulators to aid them in providing a safe 
regulatory environment. 
The paper is organized as follows: the section on blockchain provides an insight into the 
technology upon which ICO is based, along with its various uses and current application. 
This is followed by an introduction on ICOs and the regulatory steps taken in meeting the 
country-specific regulations. The paper then analyzes four cases of ICO frauds, namely, 
AriseBank, RECoin and Diamond Reserve, PlexCorps and Benebit, to analyze their 
respective modus operandi in cheating the investors. Finally, the paper provides key insights 
for investors, issuers and regulators, followed by conclusions and potential implications.  
2. Blockchain 
One of the major technological revolutions of the 21st century has been the blockchain. A 
blockchain can be described as a digitalized version of a ledger which is decentralized and 
distributed among the users of its peer-to-peer network (Underhill 2018). In simple terms, it 
can be understood as a text file which records events – for instance, transactions through 
consensus among participants of the network with no involvement of an intermediary. 
The blockchain comprises a chain of blocks which essentially are a record of all transactions 
that have taken place in its network. This aggregation of transactions in units called blocks 
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and their addition to similar existing blocks in a chain takes place through a cryptographic 
technique composed of what is called a Proof of Work (Sullivan and Burger 2017). Proof of 
Work is the mathematical procedure used to authenticate and validate transactions, and to add 
new blocks of transactions in a blockchain. The mathematical procedure in a blockchain 
network is performed by nodes called miners and the act of using this mathematical 
procedure is termed mining. Once a transaction is mined, a solution is produced called a hash. 
This is demonstrated in Figure – it has three blockchains; each hash is verified by a 
comparison to the corresponding hash in the other blockchains. In this case, all hashes are 
consistent in each blockchain and so all are valid. In practise, there would be a much larger 
number of blockchains distributed throughout the entire network, which is why blockchain is 
known as ‘distributed ledger technology’ (DLT). The other simplification made in Figure 1 is 
that the hashes are two-digit numbers, when in reality they are very long and complicated. It 
is important to notice that the previous hash matches the new hash of the previous block. For 
example, Block 3’s previous hash of 34 matches the new hash from the previous Block 2, 
which is another level of validation. That is, each block contains information from both 
previous blocks and the current event, and the integrity and authenticity of each item is 
checked against previous events. Since the hash value of the previous block is part of the 
computation of the hash value of the current block, it provides assurance about transaction 
history and saves time in verifying and tracing transactions to their source.  
- Fig1 Example of Working Blockchain Network1 
When, any transaction or event takes place on the blockchain the ledger gets updated for all 
users. That means in case of inaccuracy the hash solution produced will not match the hash in 
other blockchains in the network, which will result in it and future blocks on that chain 
becoming invalid, as demonstrated in Figure 2. In this case, consider that a hacker changed 
the amount from $20 to $30 in Block 2 of Blockchain 1. This results in a hash of 89, which is 
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different from 34, the corresponding hash in the other blockchains in the network. 
Consequently, Block 2 in Blockchain 1 is invalid, which automatically invalidates all future 
blocks as well (Block 3 in this case). Thus, a hacker can’t successfully change only one 
blockchain, because the rest of the network will realize the data have been corrupted. 
- Fig2 Example of Hacker Modifying Block 2 of Blockchain 1 from Fig1 
Blockchain can be broadly classified into two types, namely, public or open blockchain, and 
private or closed blockchain. A private blockchain is a closed network and requires 
permission for access to the network and therefore it limits access to those who are thought to 
be known and trusted. On the other hand, a public blockchain does not require any sort of 
permission to access the network. Consequently, anyone can have access by downloading and 
running the software required for the network (SEC 2018). 
One such example of a public blockchain is the Bitcoin, a virtual currency which facilitates 
transactions among its users in absence of a central intermediary, that is, without a financial 
institution. Anyone can join the network by downloading the Bitcoin software and participate 
in the network. The blockchain of Bitcoin is updated when its participants validate a 
particular transaction. It is important to understand that Bitcoin is just one example of a 
currency that uses blockchain. There are numerous others such as Bitcoin Cash, Ether, 
Litecoin, Tether and so on. 
A version of electronic cash was proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 that uses blockchain 
in the absence of a financial institution (Nakamoto 2008). He proposed a way to avoid 
reliance upon trust by facilitating the use of coins authenticated by digital signatures and 
avoiding the problem of double-spending by recording the history of transactions immune to 
being changed. The proposed system will be protected from an attack if the majority of 
participants in the network do not want the attack. Nakamoto’s proposal was based on 
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individual interest being collectivized and need for changes to be incorporated through a 
consensus rather than top-down hierarchical approach, using the network of participants to 
validate an event. 
The main features of blockchain technology can be identified in terms of its decentralization 
and encryption. It is depicted through its reliance upon its network of participants rather than 
a central authority and the ability for anyone to access the network and view the event at any 
time. And the use of encryption in maintaining security of record of transactions allows the 
technology to have a variety of uses. 
2.1 Uses of blockchain technology 
Blockchain technology has uses beyond financial transactions. Businesses are interested in 
ways to improve the accuracy and reduce the costs related to the hiring process (Moore 
2017). Blockchain can be used by a human resource department for selecting better 
employees through having access to a wide variety of information about candidates that is 
known to be authentic and immune to tampering (Catalini and Gans 2017). The data related 
to potential candidates would be stored in a virtual database that could be queried by human 
resource departments to obtain an authenticated pool of candidates meeting the required 
criteria. Additionally, job seekers would be able to exercise control over sharing of their 
personal data. 
Financial data related to companies could also be verified using blockchain-enabled 
databases that are accessed through the entity’s website. As it is with real-time updates 
provided for bank account transactions, corporate financial information could be provided in 
real time (Gepp et al. 2018). The incorporation of blockchain technology could provide real-
time verification in this process. It would provide transparency to financial statements and 
even highlight off-book transactions and accounts which are hidden (Tapscott and Tapscott 
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2017). This would represent a big step forward in addressing the problem of financial 
statement fraud, the cost of which has been estimated at more than 1.2 trillion US dollars 
worldwide (Gepp 2016). 
The ability to provide real-time information updates through blockchain technology can also 
be utilized in legal matters, especially related to patent law where the timing of getting an 
idea recorded becomes essential. Real-time updates are also relevant to the logistic industry 
to facilitate tracking supplies of numerous parts in an efficient manner (Mansfield-Devine 
2017). The maritime trading systems are plagued by security concerns relating to supply-
chain issues (Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005); blockchain could serve as a solution to this 
problem. 
Blockchain technology can also be applied to contractual agreements, both short-term and 
long-term in nature. Furthermore, the technology can be used by companies to interact with 
customers on an individual basis to market their products. The data related to customers 
would be under their control and it would not be possible for companies to profile the 
customers based on their online activity. However, customers could choose to grant 
companies access to their data, thus benefitting both the companies and customers by 
precisely matching the needs of both the parties. This would result in substantial cost savings 
through more efficient marketing. 
Blockchain technology could also provide assurance to customers about the quality of a 
product or service. A likely application is within the precious stones industry (Knight 2017). 
The technology is used to identify the source of procurement of precious stones as well as 
their authenticity. Each event or transaction in the blockchain is validated by the previous 
transaction, thereby ensuring that the asset, in this case precious stones, is what it claims to 
be. Moreover, it helps to avoid the great degree of dependence on a central authority 
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responsible for keeping track of records, thereby reducing the cost of tracking and storage of 
data (Mansfield-Devine 2017). 
In broad economic terms, blockchain technology offers multiple advantages: (i) reducing the 
cost of determining the authenticity and (ii) reducing the cost of establishing networks by 
avoiding reliance upon intermediaries (Catalini and Gans 2017). The desire of a financial 
lending world without intermediaries could become a reality; however, such a transformation 
would also imply broadening the scope of regulatory implementation from national borders to 
a global approach (Lagarde 2017). 
2.2 Current application of blockchain technology 
Apart from its widely publicized use in cryptocurrencies, blockchain technology is being 
used very actively by corporates and even by governments. One such example is in Estonia 
where the government has implemented the technology in application of its e-Residency 
program. This has enabled citizens to have improved control over their and access to their 
electronic records. The use of technology in maintaining identity information also grants it 
security from data breaches because of the decentralization (Sullivan and Burger 2017). 
Another application of blockchain technology is in global trade operations by Maersk, a 
global logistics and transportation company, which is partnered with IBM, a leader in 
providing blockchain technology solutions (IBM 2018). IBM is also partnered with Sichuan 
Hejia Company Limited to take advantage of blockchain technology solutions in procurement 
of pharmaceuticals. Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides support to various blockchain 
applications such as Sawtooth, Corda R3, PokitDok and Samsung Nexledger, by providing a 
cost-efficient and secured development platform (AWS 2018). It has been reported that the 
advantages of blockchain technology are being considered by other companies such as 
Walmart, British Airways, UPS, and FedEx (Krauth 2018). Even the NASDAQ and New 
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York Stock Exchange are trying to tap into the advantages of blockchain technology 
(Tapscott and Tapscott 2017). The numerous advantages it offers beyond the present public 
view of cryptocurrencies clearly highlight the tremendous potential of the technology and its 
capability to disrupt and transform current business practises. 
3. Initial Coin Offerings 
The use of blockchain technology has paved the way for raising finance via a new method. 
An essential feature is its virtual immutability which prevents a single user from making 
changes to the chain (as demonstrated in Figure 2 above). Consequently, this has resulted in 
firms using this technology to raise funds through an Initial Coin Offering (ICO). 
An ICO, also known as an Initial Token Sales (ITS), refers to a digital method of raising 
finance whereby the issuer offers tokens to investors in lieu of other well-established 
cryptocurrencies or fiat money. The idea is to raise capital to finance future development 
activities of the business as well as to generate excitement and an established user-base for an 
entity’s future offerings. 
The creation and dissemination of coins (or tokens) in an ICO uses blockchain technology to 
facilitate wide participation of investors. The ease with which funds can be raised and the 
growing popularity of ICOs is evident from the fact that a study on funds raised by 372 ICOs 
found that a total of USD 3.7 billion has been raised in 2017 (Ernst & Young 2018). ICOs are 
generally viewed by start-ups as an important channel for raising funds (Underhill 2018). 
However, with the growing popularity even established firms have launched or are planning 
to launch their respective ICOs, which is evident from the examples of Perth Mint and 
IAGON (Garvey 2018). 
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The surge in fundraising through an ICO can be attributed to its being quick and cost-
efficient. This is derived from the time and cost saved from compliance with securities laws 
and regulations which must be taken into consideration in the case of traditional methods of 
raising funds. Moreover, the use of blockchain technology attracts investors because it is a 
new innovation with the potential to yield huge returns (Underhill 2018). Investment in an 
ICO is different from investment in an IPO, because the investment and ownership of coins 
acquired in an ICO does not guarantee ownership in a company, which is the case in an IPO. 
The ICO process begins with the announcement of an ICO by the issuer followed by 
marketing of the ICO through the company’s website and other social media channels, and 
eventually the offerings of coins through an ICO within a designated time-period. The 
announcement of an ICO is accompanied by the release of a white paper, which can be 
considered similar to a prospectus in case of an IPO. The white paper contains information 
about the project, coins being offered, the rights available to investors, lifecycle of the 
project, other legal terms and conditions, and more. It becomes necessary to understand that 
while the white paper serves a function like a prospectus, it is typically less detailed and does 
not adhere to any specified guidelines (Underhill 2018). 
The wide variety of ICOs also draws attention to the kind of coins being offered. At times, 
these may facilitate the holder to access products or services of the issuer or which the issuer 
intends to develop from funds raised through the ICO (ESMA 2017). Generally, this is the 
most common type of coin offered, where it facilitates access to services by payment 
exclusively through the coin. An example is the entity Token Report, which through an ICO 
offered Token Clarity coins enabling users of those tokens to access databases dedicated to 
tracking other ICOs (Underhill 2018). The other most common type of coins offered through 
ICOs facilitates users to use them as normal currencies where acceptable or be able to get 
them converted into fiat currencies (Underhill 2018; ESMA 2017). As per Lu (2019), partner 
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at 256 Ventures (an early stage crypto-investment fund), the classification of tokens into 
“security” and “utility” tokens can be attributed to the US securities laws and may not be 
applicable to countries such as Australia and therefore Lu suggests a classification based on 
the rights the tokens generate. On reviewing literature across countries, he proposed a 
classification of tokens with a jurisdictionally neutral mindset. He classified tokens as: 
• Investment tokens representing those that are considered assets and promises a 
financial return or benefit in the future, 
• Utility tokens similar to digital coupons that provide its participants with access or 
utility to an entity’s product or service in the future and  
• Payment tokens representing those which may be used as means of payment. 
The coins in an ICO are usually offered through one of two formats. The issuer may issue the 
coins during or immediately after the sale. The other more common method is a pre-sale in 
which the coins are not developed for distribution and are scheduled for distribution at a later 
date (Underhill 2018). 
3.1 ICOs versus Crowdfunding 
According to Schwienbacher and Larralde (2010), crowdfunding can be defined as financing 
a venture by individuals instead of professional parties. Similarly, Mollick and Nanda (2015) 
refer to crowdfunding as funding projects by drawing small amounts of funds from a 
relatively larger number of individuals without the use of standard financial intermediaries. In 
cases of crowdfunding, investors have clear expectations in lieu of their investment – in some 
cases they expect nothing and in others they expect returns in the form of products, equity or 
monetary repayments with interest (Beaulieu et al. 2015; Gleasure and Feller 2016).  
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Zetzsche et al. (2017) view ICOs as a combination of crowdfunding and blockchain. 
Crowdfunding and ICOs are similar in that their mechanism for raising funds allows 
investors early access to fund new ventures. Additionally, both provide an alternative 
mechanism for funding operations to businesses that are not of interest to venture capitalists 
or other institutional investors. Further, they do not rely on traditional financial intermediaries 
for raising funds and are generally cost-effective in comparison to an IPO. 
However, ICOs and crowdfunding have key differences. Crowdfunding involves the use of a 
central platform hosted by a third-party provider while an ICO makes the use of blockchain 
and a decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) network for raising funds (Schweizer et al. 2017). In 
an ideal scenario, crowdfunding platforms and banks serve as trusted entities for transactions 
whereas in case of an ICO the verification of transactions takes place through a network-wide 
consensus (Arnold et al. 2019). In terms of accessibility, crowdfunding is generally limited to 
a certain country or regions whereas ICOs are accessible more broadly. ICOs generally fund 
technology-related ventures while crowdfunding often spans various categories such as 
hardware, software, technology and food. However, in recent times, ICOs have expanded 
beyond technology offerings, an example of that is providing tokens for real estate ventures 
(Bailey 2018; Zmudzinski 2019). There are also differences in investor expectations and risk. 
ICO investors expect to earn a profit for their investment whereas crowdfunding investors 
may or not expect returns from their investment. Additionally, in a crowdfunding project, 
investors have clear expectations about the outcome on completion, but clear expectations 
regarding the outcome from ICO funding is often absent. Differences also exist in relation to 
regulations; regulations pertaining to crowdfunding are more certain and regulators have been 
overwhelmingly more positive towards crowdfunding. The less certain regulations relating to 
ICOs are discussed in this paper.  
4. Regulatory Steps towards ICOs in Key Jurisdictions 
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As of December 2017, there was no specific regulatory framework focussed exclusively on 
ICOs, but the growing popularity, surge in volume of raising finance through ICOs, and the 
rise in fraudulent instances involving ICOs, prompted regulatory authorities across the globe 
to issue guidelines, make key announcements and sometimes take action (Chance 2018). 
The regulatory developments and their evolution in jurisdictions that have taken a clear 
regulatory stance or in which a meaningful amount of funds have been raised through ICOs 
are discussed below.  
• Australia 
ICO activity has been on the rise in Australia. It is evident from the fact that the Perth 
Mint, one of the biggest gold refiners in Australia, is developing blockchain products 
backed by gold (Garvey 2018). In response to this growing focus on ICO, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) issued guidelines pertaining to ICOs in 
September 2017 (ASIC 2017). The guidelines aim to provide a clear sense of direction to 
businesses wishing to raise funds through the medium of ICOs. Through the guidelines, 
ASIC informed the businesses and investors alike that whether an ICO falls under the 
purview of Australian Corporations Act will depend upon the structuring and operations 
of the ICO as well as the rights gained through the ownership of coins offered through the 
ICO. Hence, if an ICO exhibits traits of a security it will be subject to the Australian 
Corporations Act and if it does not resemble a security it will fall under the purview of 
general law and consumer law of Australia related to the offer of products or services 
(Chance 2018). The main focus of the regulatory guidance issued in 2017 was the 
Australian Consumer Law and the Corporations Act. In 2019, the regulatory guidance 
was updated to incorporate detailed obligations for cryptocurrency firms to comply with 
under the Australian Corporations Act, the ASIC Act and other laws. The guidance 
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covered the requirement to hold an Australian financial services (AFS) license and 
widening the scope of consumer protection. 
• China 
In September 2017, the People’s Bank of China issued a circular banning ICOs (Borak 
2018) declaring them illegal, stating that ICOs may promote crimes pertaining to 
financial fraud, Ponzi schemes, illegal securities offerings and more (Chance 2018). The 
Chinese regulators have been active in persuading foreign-listed Chinese companies to 
abandon plans for raising funds through ICOs. An example of this is Renren, a Chinese 
social networking website, which dropped its ICO plans in January 2018 (Yang et al. 
2018). The Chinese government continues to maintain its stance against cryptocurrencies 
including the issuance of ICOs as illegal (Congress 2018b; Williams 2019). 
• France 
In October 2017, the French Regulatory Authority, Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
(AMF), published a discussion paper to obtain views of key stakeholders relating to 
various possibilities of regulatory frameworks that can be applied to ICOs (AMF 2017). 
The discussion paper considered the creation of a best-practise guide for ICOs, or 
extending securities regulation to ICOs or developing a new set of regulations pertaining 
to ICOs. Additionally, the AMF announced a program to provide guidance for a 
framework regulating ICOs and protecting investors and issuers, called UNICORN 
(Universal Node to ICO Research and Network). The bill was passed in 2019 regulating 
the country’s crypto industry including the establishment of a legal framework for ICOs. 
The bill provided the issuers of ICOs with an option to apply for approval from AMF if 
they complied with requirements such as (i) incorporation or registration within the 
jurisdiction, (ii) providing adequate information about the token, project and the company 
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and (iii) complying with the necessary anti-money laundering (AML hereafter) and 
counter financing of terrorism (CFT hereafter) requirements (Helms 2019). 
• Hong Kong 
The regulatory authority in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC), released a press statement in September 2017 relating to ICOs (SFC 
2018). Consistent with the views of Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the SFC 
identified digital coins offered in ICO as a virtual commodity subject to regulations of 
Hong Kong securities law, depending upon the features they exhibit. Further, if the coin 
offerings fell under the definition of “security” then the activities of such coin would be 
regulated and subject to Hong Kong’s product or license authorization requirement 
(Chance 2018). The statement further warned investors of the risks of investments in 
ICOs. The regulatory authorities are still under the process of developing regulations to 
govern ICOs. As of December 2018, the SFC was set to tighten the regulations on 
cryptocurrencies including requirements such as ICOs for token which have been in 
existence for at least 12 months. The implementation of regulations shall take place in 
stages (Kihara 2018). 
• Japan 
The amendments in Payment Services Act (PSA) of Japan in early 2017 defined 
cryptocurrencies as “Virtual Currencies” and virtual currency exchanges as “Virtual 
Currencies Business Operators” and were required to be registered with Japan’s Financial 
Services Agency (JFSA 2017). As of December 2018, no regulations pertaining to ICOs 
existed in Japan and the need for regulatory framework for ICO in Japan by JFSA is 
under evaluation (JFSA 2017; Chance 2018). In the meanwhile, the Japan Cryptocurrency 
Business Association (JCBA) came up with its recommendations on ICO regulations in 
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2019 (JCBA 2019). The focus of the regulations was to expand cryptocurrency in 
Japanese domestic exchange, establishing clarity over the definition and regulations for 
security and utility tokens (Tashiro 2019; Yakubowski 2019). 
• Russia 
Russia is only second to the US in terms of the number of ICO projects originating from a 
particular country (Ernst & Young 2017). The Russian government’s approach towards 
cryptocurrencies has shifted from being cautious to acknowledging its presence and 
growth. However, at present we found no regulations pertaining to cryptocurrencies. In 
June 2017, the Russian central bank along with the Ministry of Finance made an 
announcement to develop regulations to regulate cryptocurrencies (Chance 2018). The 
Russian Ministry of Finances introduced a draft bill on digital financial assets in 2018. It 
limited the participation in ICOs to only qualified investors with exceptions to this 
condition to be decided by the Russian Central Bank. It also provided definitions for 
“digital assets” and “digital rights” (Congress 2018a). As of June 2019, the bill is still 
under consideration before it can be enacted for implementation.  
• Singapore 
Unlike that of many other countries, the approach adopted in Singapore towards 
cryptocurrencies has been positive (ACCA 2018). In 2017, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) stated that if coin offerings through an ICO resemble a security 
offering then it will be regulated within the purview of the Securities and Futures Act 
(SFA) (MAS 2017b). Further, consistent with the US SEC, the issuers of such coins are 
required to issue a prospectus, and registration is applicable. Further, in a joint report with 
Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), the financial crime division of Singapore Police 
issued a warning to investors about the potential risks of investing in ICOs (MAS 2017a). 
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The MAS updated its guidelines for businesses interested in raising funds through an ICO 
in 2018. It laid down guidelines for businesses to act in compliance with AML and CFT 
regulations. The guidelines required all the parties related to an ICO to comply with AML 
and CFT policies. Additionally, a requirement to have license to undertake issuing and 
advising on matters related to ICOs was made mandatory (2018).  
• South Korea 
South Korea ranks third after the US and Japan in the market for bitcoin trading and is the 
largest exchange market for Ethereum’s cryptocurrency – the Ether (Kim 2017). As per 
government data, around USD 89 million were raised in ICOs in September 2017 (Kim 
2017). As a result, just as with China, the Financial Services Commission (FSC 
hereafter), the South Korean regulatory authority, banned ICOs in the country (Kim 2017; 
Nakamura and Kim 2017). The regulatory authority cited growing risk of financial scams 
and speculation as the reasons behind the move. However, unlike the Chinese, the South 
Korean public could invest in foreign ICOs (Kim 2017). In the first half of 2019, the FSC 
continued to maintain its stance of a ban on domestic ICOs and citing it to be a “high 
risk” engagement. The stance was in response to a survey conducted by the Financial 
Supervisory Services (FSS)  with respondents being companies who had conducted ICOs 
in foreign countries (FSI 2019; Khatri 2019). 
• Switzerland 
Switzerland has emerged as one of the key jurisdictions of raising funds through ICOs, 
raising 600 million US dollars, which is a quarter of the total funds raised in ICOs in 2017 
(Australian 2018). In September 2017, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority 
(FINMA) stated that investigations were undertaken to probe the breaches of regulatory 
provisions by ICO (FINMA 2017). The report further defined ICO as an initial public 
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offering in a digital form that makes use of blockchain technology. Consistent with 
regulators in other countries, FINMA stated that the structuring of an ICO will determine 
the application of securities law, and if applicable, regulations relating to banking law, 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing, among others, shall apply. The Swiss 
regulatory authority also warned the investors about the risks related to investment in 
ICOs. In a follow-up to the guidelines issued in 2017, FINMA published guidelines 
regulating the treatment of ICOs in 2018 (FINMA 2018). FINMA determined the 
application of financial regulations on a case-by-case basis as each ICO is different from 
each other. It further provided a clarification over its classification of tokens into payment 
(when used as means of value transfer), asset (when used as equity claim or debt) and 
utility tokens (when facilitating access to a service or application by means of blockchain-
based infrastructure). Additionally, compliance with AML and CFT regulations for 
payment tokens was made mandatory (FINMA 2018). 
• United States 
The United States (US) was among the first countries to initiate the development of a 
regulatory framework towards ICOs. The laws and regulations applicable to ICOs in the 
US vary, based on the location of issue, the investors to which the ICO is being directed 
and the kind of services that are or will be provided. Where an investment is made in an 
entity with a profit motive that depends on the managerial efforts of others rather than the 
utilization of investment based on its functionality for personal consumption, then 
offering of such coins will be considered securities and will fall under the purview of the 
regulator, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and will be subject to its security 
laws (Chance 2018; Tew and Freedman 1973). In other words, if an investment in a coin 
offered through an ICO is made to earn profit rather than utilize the coin on the basis of 
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its functionality for personal use then the coin would be considered a security and a 
subject of security regulations under the Howey Test (Chance 2018). 
To establish clarity about what falls under the purview of securities regulation, the SEC 
released an investigative report on an entity called the DAO in July 2017 (SEC 2017a). 
The coins offered by DAO exhibited characteristics of a security. The SEC also stated 
that classification of coin offerings as security depends upon a number of factors and the 
assessment of a coin as a security shall vary on a case-by-case basis; hence, at present no 
applicable regulatory guidance exists on the issue (Chance 2018). Further, in October 
2017, LabCFTC, a division of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
stated that if ICO coins do not meet the conditions of the Howey Test they could be 
considered commodities and be a subject of their jurisdiction (LabCFTC 2017). In May 
2019, the SEC organized a public forum comprising experts from industry and academia 
to facilitate communication and a better understanding around DLT and digital assets 
(SEC 2019). 
• United Kingdom 
In 2014, the Bank of England (BoE) downplayed the risk posed by cryptocurrencies to 
the stability of UK’s financial system (Ali et al. 2014). The Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) of the UK is yet to take definite measures towards development of a regulatory 
framework for the ICO market in the UK. However, the FCA has been cautious about its 
approach towards ICOs and has warned against investing in them by terming them 
speculative and high-risk instruments (FCA 2017). In 2018, the governor of BoE raised 
concerns over the need to regulate cryptocurrencies (Kharpal 2018). As of June 2019, any 
definitive measure regulating cryptocurrencies, including ICOs, in the context of UK is 
yet to be taken. 
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5. Cases of ICOs Fraud 
In 2017, in the US alone, the eagerness to bypass securities law using an ICO was evident 
from the fact that not one ICO was registered with the SEC. The lack of an established 
regulatory framework to regulate ICOs not only created confusion in the market for issuers 
but also provided an opportunity for people with ill intentions to carry out fraudulent 
activities relating to pump-and-dump schemes, pyramid and Ponzi Schemes and even money 
laundering (Underhill 2018). An ICO is an attractive opportunity for fraudsters because of a 
range of factors including a lack of due diligence and information (DeVoe 2018). 
An ICO is accompanied by issuance of a white paper, but unlike in a prospectus the 
information provided is not always accurate and detailed. Furthermore, the information 
provided cannot be verified, which leads to potential fraudsters using false information to 
mislead. Moreover, fraudsters may also create websites with vague and incomplete 
information. They may further make use of various social media channels and even use 
celebrity endorsements to attract the attention of investors in huge numbers to perpetrate the 
fraud scheme on a large scale (Underhill 2018). 
There are numerous examples of ICO frauds such as Opair and Ebitz, Confido, Prodeum, 
OneCoin and Optioment. Recently, in April 2018 in Vietnam, over 600 million US dollars 
were identified to be lost to ICO fraud schemes through the two ICOs, namely, iFan and 
Pincoin, but detailed information about the case is yet to be made public (Floyd 2018). There 
are plenty of relatively small, alleged ICO scams, but because of a lack of reliable 
information, this study focused on cases that government authorities are involved with. The 
specific criteria for choosing the cases included (i) the case being discussed in online media 
and websites that specifically focus on cryptocurrencies, (ii) involvement of regulatory 
authorities in the investigation of such cases, (iii) the scheme garnering considerable attention 
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from investors and (iv) a substantial amount being raised in the scheme. The four chosen 
cases are discussed below, which have and still act as a source for regulatory developments. 
5.1 AriseBank 
As per the company’s website, AriseBank, also known as AriseBank Limited or AriseBank 
Foundation, LLC, was co-founded in early 2017 by Jared Rice Sr and Stanley Ford with 
headquarters in Dallas, Texas. It was marketed as a decentralized bank with the ability to 
provide a wide-range of banking products compatible with over 700 virtual currencies. 
Further, it was marketed as being among the world’s largest platforms for cryptocurrency 
with the sole aim to establish it as a form of fiat money and change the dynamics of the 
banking sector (Aitken 2018). 
In October 2017, AriseBank launched its ICO and a test version of its banking operations. 
The ICO was promoted on social media, the company’s website and through celebrity 
endorsements. Around the same time, it issued a white paper giving an overview of the 
products and the management team. The paper also gave a brief overview of the bank’s own 
digital currency called “AriseCoin” and its plan of offering it through the ICO. The 
AriseCoin ICO started in November with a “private sale”, followed by a “pre-sale” in 
December. The bank released a press statement in January claiming to have raised around 
600 million US dollars out of its goal of one billion. The coin distribution was scheduled for 
February, 2018 (SEC 2018). 
In January 2018, a “Cease and Desist” order was issued by the Texas Department of Banking 
to AriseBank, prohibiting them from misleading investors about their engagement in the 
banking business in the State of Texas. Following this, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filed litigation against AriseBank in the Federal District Court of Texas. 
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The SEC filed litigation to stop the issuance of securities by AriseBank for violating several 
sections of US Securities Exchange Act on the following grounds(SEC 2018):  
• Issuance of unregistered securities 
The securities law in the US makes it mandatory for companies to disclose their financial 
information by registering their securities with SEC. The idea is to enable investors to 
make rational investment decisions based on available information. Since AriseCoin ICO 
was a security without registration of the coin or the bank with SEC, there was a violation 
of the Act. Also in 2017, the CEO of AriseBank Jared Rice Sr made false claims of 
AriseCoin not being a subject of regulations by the SEC. 
• Use of misleading and false information 
In January 2018, AriseBank made false claims about acquiring a Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured bank, KFMC Bank Holding Company, which 
facilitated offering secured services to its customers. However, no records supporting 
FDIC-insurance were found. FDIC had no records of any change in ownership involving 
the parties mentioned, rendering the claims to be false and misleading to investors. 
Further, in its white paper, AriseBank claimed to offer its own Visa cards that would 
facilitate payment for goods and services using any of the 700 cryptocurrencies that the 
customers could hold in their respective AriseBank account. It was stated that the card 
was being provided in partnership with Marqeta, a payment solution firm. However, the 
claims also turned out to be false when Marqeta publicly denied an association with 
AriseBank. 
• Omission of material information 
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AriseBank provided brief information about the background of its executives on the 
company’s website as well as in its white papers. However, none of these sources 
mentioned the criminal background of its two key executives. Such information would be 
important to investors in their decision-making. 
As a result of the violations, the court froze assets of AriseBank and its co-founders and 
this ensured recovery of the various digital currencies held by AriseBank. 
5.2 RECoin and Diamond Reserve 
RECoin Group Foundation, LLC (RECoin) was a limited liability company incorporated in 
2017 with its headquarters in Las Vegas, Nevada, and was marketed as a company involved 
in real estate investment and smart contracts for real estate through an ICO. Another such 
entity was Diamond Reserve Club, also known as DRC World Inc, which was incorporated in 
2017 with its headquarters in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The principal business of DRC was 
investment in diamonds through funds raised through an ICO. DRC was also marketed as 
obtaining discounts with retailers for investors in DRC. Both the companies were solely 
owned and managed by Maksim Zaslavskiy (SEC 2017c). Between July and September, 
2017, Zaslavskiy raised 300,000 US dollars from investors in digital coins in RECoin and 
then DRC during their ICOs (SEC 2017c). 
The purported objective of these ICOs was the conversion of fiat currency or other digital 
currencies such as Bitcoin into a digital token that would derive its value from investment in 
an underlying asset. The underlying asset in the case of RECoin was real estate, whereas in 
the case of DRC it was diamonds. It was claimed that appreciation of investment or growth in 
business, or demand for coins, would drive the value of coins (SEC 2017c). 
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In September 2017, the SEC filed litigation against Zaslavskiy and his companies seeking to 
stop issuance of securities for violating several sections of the US Securities Exchange Act on 
the following grounds (SEC 2017c): 
• Issuance of unregistered securities 
Since the securities being offered through the ICO of RECoin were not registered with 
SEC, there was a violation of the Securities Exchange Act. Further, in case of DRC, an 
attempt to bypass the registration regulation was made by Zaslavskiy through marketing 
the ICO as an Initial Membership Offer (IMO), offering membership in the entity rather 
than investment. 
• Use of misleading and false information 
To attract investors, false and misleading claims were made by Zaslavskiy on various 
platforms such as social media, the companies’ websites and in the ICO white papers. 
First, it was claimed that investment in RECoin and DRC ICOs granted investors 
ownership of digital coins when none existed. Secondly, it was falsely claimed that the 
RECoin ICO was successful in raising four million US dollars when only 300,000 were 
raised. Thirdly, while none existed, it was claimed that RECoin and DRC had a team of 
professionals in the field to facilitate investments of funds raised. Finally, false claims 
were made about potential returns to investors from investment in these ICOs. 
5.3 PlexCorps  
PlexCorps, also known as PlexCoin and traded as SidePay.Ca, was an unincorporated entity 
controlled by Dominic Lacroix. As per the company’s website, the company comprised a 
team of over forty professional experts dispersed across the globe working towards the 
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primary objective of increasing the accessibility of cryptocurrencies to the general public 
(SEC 2017b). According to one of the white papers, PlexCorps was based in Singapore.  
The PlexCoin ICO was launched through a pre-sale by PlexCorps in August 2017. The 
company’s website stated that PlexCoin had the potential to become the mainstream 
cryptocurrency (SEC 2017b). Further, one of the white papers declared an expected return in 
excess of 13 times the original investment within a month (Shin 2017). Subsequently, the 
PlexCoin ICO raised 15 million US dollars (SEC 2017b). 
In December 2017 SEC filed litigation against PlexCorps, Dominic Lacroix and his partner 
Sabrina Paradis-Royer, seeking to stop the issuance of securities for violating several sections 
of US Securities Exchange Act on the following grounds (SEC 2017b): 
• Issuance of unregistered securities 
Since the securities being offered through the ICO of PlexCoin were not registered with 
the SEC, there was a violation of the Securities Exchange Act. Further, an attempt to 
bypass the registration regulation was made by Lacroix by marketing the coins being 
offered through PlexCoin ICO as cryptocurrencies rather than securities.  
• Use of misleading and false information 
In circumstances similar to the previous case study, false and misleading claims were 
made by PlexCorps and Lacroix on various platforms such as social media, the company 
website and ICO white papers. First, it was claimed that appreciation in the value of 
PlexCoin tokens was based upon the investment of funds raised through the ICO. 
Secondly, PlexCorps’s team was claimed to comprise over forty experts with the 
headquarters in Singapore. However, the claims were false as the entity comprised only a 
few employees based in Quebec. Thirdly, claims were made to keep the identity of 
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PlexCorps executives hidden to avoid competition and issues relating to privacy. 
However, the main reason to keep the identity of Dominic Lacroix a secret was his past 
record of being a violator of securities law in Canada. As a result, fake names were used 
to carry out the business activities and Lacroix’s involvement in the business was denied. 
False claims were also made about potential returns to investors from investment in 
PlexCoin ICO. 
• Misappropriation of funds 
One of the objectives of the PlexCoin ICO was to raise funds to develop other products of 
PlexCorps, but a portion of funds raised through the ICO was misappropriated by Lacroix 
and his partner for personal expenditure. 
5.4 Benebit 
Benebit was a blockchain-based decentralized platform that facilitated interaction among 
geographically diverse entities (Top ICO List 2018). The primary motive was to create a 
platform enabling customers to store and trade points from loyalty-based programs using 
cryptocurrencies (DeVoe 2018). As per the company’s website, the goal was a decentralized 
global network for virtual customer loyalty currency (Sedgwick 2018). 
Benebit’s ICO pre-sale event was promoted by an ICO Syndicate, a community of investors 
interested in ICOs. Benebit aggressively promoted its project, spending over 500,000 US 
dollars on marketing its campaign, hiring a public relations team and being active on social 
media. This drew the attention of potential investors and led to the development of a base of 
approximately 9,000 followers on a social media channel (Shome 2018). However, the 
website and all its accounts on social media were pulled down once it was identified that the 
pictures of the management team were fake, having in fact been taken from a school website. 
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The scam resulted in loss of investor funds somewhere between 2.7 million and 4 million US 
dollars (DeVoe 2018).  
There were two key factors behind the success of Benebit’s ICO scam: 
• Element of Legitimacy 
The huge expenditure incurred from promoting the Benebit ICO led to a big following for 
the ICO across various social media platforms. This was further supplemented by positive 
reviews and high scores from various ICO reviewing websites, which granted the Benebit 
ICO legitimacy and convinced investors that the scheme was authentic (Shome 2018). 
• Lack of Due Diligence 
One of the important aspects of investing in a new opportunity involves conducting due 
diligence on the entities and its key executives. This process was overlooked in the case 
of Benebit, leading to successful execution of the scam (DeVoe 2018). Third-party 
promoters of Benebit did not undertake a verification procedure on the passport details of 
key executives of Benebit, which also contributed to the fraud being possible on such a 
large scale (Shome 2018). 
6. Key Insights 
The approaches to regulate ICOs differ across jurisdictions. Some countries such as China 
and South Korea have imposed an outright ban on ICOs, while the US have laid down clear 
guidelines around ICOs and others such as Malta and Singapore which have left no stone 
unturned in attracting businesses by providing a specific regulatory and administrative 
framework for ICOs (Mondaq 2019; Lu 2019). Malta, in particular, has earned itself the title 
of “Blockchain Island” (Mondaq 2019). The presence of such a wide variation in the 
regulatory approaches and a continued lack of clarity at the global level makes it essential to 
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have a set of guidelines to assist investors, issuers and regulators. Key insights for these 
concerned stakeholders are discussed below. 
6.1 Insights for Investors 
It is important to remember that not all ICOs are carried out with the purpose of cheating 
investors. However, it is essential for investors to take necessary steps to protect themselves 
against the possibility of fraud. Based on the evaluation of the cases mentioned above, the 
following recommendations are made to investors to help them determine the legitimacy of 
an ICO. 
• ICO white paper: Investors should not be enticed solely by the claims of the issuer 
and the marketing strategies adopted to lure them; instead, an investor should read all 
white papers in detail to understand the nature of the proposal and assist in 
determining its feasibility. Additionally, the long-term plans of the issuer in relation to 
the ICO should be evaluated; in most cases this information should be mentioned in a 
white paper. A lack of clarity in long-term goals and objectives could be an indicator 
of fraud. 
• Offering’s Utility: A deep analysis of the value proposition of the product or service 
being offered through an ICO is recommended for investors to determine whether the 
proposal has sufficient benefits to warrant investment, and whether it is feasible that 
these benefits could be realized. This information would be a useful indicator about 
the proposed ICO’s legitimacy. 
• Management Due Diligence: A detailed background check on all key executives 
would assist in determining the legitimacy of the proposed ICO. Thorough diligence 
would serve in protecting investors from fraud; this would include reverse searches of 
social media profiles, criminal record checks and an evaluation of past job history. 
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• ICO Ratings and Reviews: Investors should inform their decision-making with a 
variety of sources including both the ratings provided by rating agencies and expert 
opinions available on multiple cryptocurrency websites. As is the case with traditional 
IPOs, in the case of ICOs ratings and reviews do not guarantee protection, but they 
are still a good preliminary source of information to consider.  
6.2 Insights for Issuers 
Prior ICO scams where investors have lost their money have tarnished the reputation of 
genuine firms aiming to raise funds through ICOs. In the light of the growing cases of fraud 
through ICOs, it has become necessary for genuine issuers to provide as much information as 
possible to differentiate themselves from ICO scams and gain the trust of investors. The 
following recommendations are made to issuers. 
• Plain language: Without compromising on accuracy, issuers should use plain 
language that is relatively easy to understand. This will aid investor comprehension 
and help to differentiate them from fraudsters.  
• Public disclosure of information: To secure the trust of the investors, genuine issuers 
in all white papers should adopt the best practise of providing detailed information 
about their management team. This would facilitate verification background checks 
for management, something that investors are strongly encouraged to conduct.  
• Helpdesk: As a best practise, ICO issuers should establish a helpdesk to answer the 
queries of investors and to explain the ICO offering and underlying technology if the 
investors require clarification. It is important that this helpdesk also refers to 
professional financial advisors and third-party information sources such as 
government guidelines where appropriate. 
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• Regulatory guidance: In the absence of a clear, detailed regulatory framework, issuers 
are encouraged to seek guidance from the relevant regulators and develop a legal 
framework to avoid any issues in the future. This will become increasingly important 
as new laws and regulations are adopted. In addition to avoiding any compliance 
issues, this approach is also an important step in building trust with investors.  
The above-mentioned steps are recommended as best-practise to issuers to increase 
transparency and provide improved assurances as to the legitimacy of ICO investments. This 
will help genuine issuers attract investors in the long run. 
6.3 Insights for Regulators 
The uncertainties surrounding ICOs as new instruments make the role of regulators crucial. 
To ensure the safety of investors, and to provide a proper framework for issuers to adhere to, 
the following recommendations are made to regulators: 
• Dedicated unit: Regulators should consider establishing a separate unit that 
exclusively investigates matters related to ICOs. This would allow the unique features 
of ICOs to be properly considered. This dedicated unit could develop a tailored 
framework providing clear guidelines to potential issuers, while safeguarding 
investors. 
• Low-cost compliance: For many issuers, especially start-ups, a major advantage of 
raising funds through an ICO lies in saving on compliance costs compared with a 
traditional IPO. As a result, to save on the cost of compliance, ICOs are viewed as a 
way of bypassing security regulations. A possible remedy is to establish a low-cost 
compliance framework for ICOs which would encourage issuers to comply with the 
regulatory framework and at the same time maintain the attractiveness of raising 
funds through an ICO. 
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• Mandatory registration: A mandatory registration requirement for ICOs signals to 
issuers that there is regulatory oversight, which is a subtle encouragement of 
legitimate behaviour. Registration may also provide investors a sense of security 
regarding the funds being invested and promote an active marketplace. 
A well-defined regulatory framework would establish clarity. This clarity would in turn 
encourage compliance from issuers. Investors would also be able to evaluate the extent of 
compliance associated with an ICO and use that information to assist them in determining the 
risk from investing in that ICO. As lower cost is one of the key features of ICOs, it is 
important that regulatory frameworks ensure the cost of compliance is relatively low to 
encourage compliant behaviour from issuers. 
6.4 Notes on Recommendations 
At a broad level, these recommendations help to highlight the aspects to be considered by the 
relevant stakeholders so that an innovative opportunity for financing operations could be 
utilized to its full extent and hence yield returns to all those involved. 
It is critical to understand that adopting the above recommendations for investors does not 
guarantee complete protection from ICO fraud. Rather they are precautionary measures that 
can facilitate the discovery of fraud in the initial stages. For instance, in the case of 
AriseBank, following the recommendation of Management Due Diligence would have 
revealed the criminal background of the key executives involved. This would have acted as a 
red flag for investors in their decision-making or have been discovered by a dedicated 
regulatory unit. The same is true in Benebit where the information about the management 
was fake. 
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7. Conclusion and Implications 
A common modus operandi for ICO fraudsters has been revealed from analyzing four 
prominent cases. ICO fraudsters make attempts to attract investors using various social media 
channels and celebrity endorsements. In addition, information on the company websites and 
white papers is usually vague and intensively technological, and it presents the product in a 
complicated manner. Further, the old tactic of promising unexpectedly high investment 
returns is present in all cases. Finally, the coins in the cases analyzed were either offered in 
stages or were advertised to be offered at a discount for a limited period. The motive is to 
highlight the urgency and promote a fear of missing out on huge investment returns. 
The study provides implications for both investors and issuers. Investors should not jump on 
the first available opportunity to invest in an ICO. It is essential to read the white paper and to 
ensure that the concept adds value. The business motive for the ICO and the feasibility of the 
proposed product or service development should be evaluated. In the absence of regulations 
protecting the rights of those investing in an ICO, it becomes particularly important for a 
potential investor to conduct due diligence on the management team of the issuer. It is also 
essential to obtain views from various online forums about the project being undertaken 
through an ICO and views of rating companies. Traditional ratings given by the likes of 
Moody’s and S&P do not guarantee the success of a company, and in a similar manner, 
ratings given to companies aiming to raise funds through an ICO may not be completely 
reliable. However, it is an added measure which might be helpful to an investor. 
The cases analyzed should highlight to a potential issuer the need to adhere to regulations in 
order to avoid being subject to fines and penalties by regulators at a later stage. The issuers 
should evaluate their offerings to determine whether they qualify as a security or not, and if it 
is required obtain independent legal guidance. Issuers wishing to genuinely raise funds 
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through an ICO need to overcome the negative association because of previous ICO scams. 
To build trust with investors, we recommend increased transparency through the public 
disclosure of detailed information using easy-to-understand language and establishment of a 
helpdesk to attend to any queries. 
Regulators also have a key role to play. There is a need for a regulatory framework specific to 
ICOs that protects investors whilst maintaining the low-cost advantage of ICOs as a method 
of raising funds. One recommendation is clear: the mandatory registration of all ICOs.  
The adoption of the recommendations in this paper by investors and issuers, as well as the 
development of a tailored regulatory framework, will foster growth in the ICO market 
through reducing the prevalence of fraud. The findings from this initial study of ICO frauds 
lay a foundation for future research to analyze further ICO cases and develop a detailed best-
practise guide in relation to ICOs for all stakeholders. 
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